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TWO STATES AND REAL ESTATE
HERBERT F. GooDRICH t
Law suits in which legally important events have taken place in
more than one state have not infrequently been decided by courts with
reference only to the internal law of the forum. The problems of the
legal effect of foreign facts have passed unnoticed. This is less fre-
quent than it used to be; judges and counsel are now for the most part
conscious of the two state problem, though finding the answer may
baffle the most ingenious. If one may venture a sweeping obiter dictum,
it would be to the effect that the present consciousness of Conflict of
Laws problems is due in large part to the influence of Joseph Henry
Beale. Not only to the thousands of his own students, but through
many of them as teachers, he made Conflict of Laws one of the exciting
intellectual adventures of a stimulating law school curriculum. His
magnificent casebooks, concerning the retail price of which law students
have composed ribald songs, have been the great mine of authoritative
material for judges and brief writers. His essays in legal magazines
have both conveyed ideas of his own and stirred up thinking in others.
And finally through a dozen years of work upon the Restatement, fol-
lowed by Beale on the Conflict of Laws, we have both a permanent rec-
ord of his contribution to group thought plus the summation of a long
lifetime of scholarly thought and research in a highly important field of
the law. The importance of the two state element in legal questions
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has become recognized 1 and Professor Beale has done much to bring
it about.
Upon one general proposition in the Conflict of Laws there has
been little if any difference of opinion among the authorities. The ref-
erence to the law of the state where land lies with regard to legal ques-
tions involving rights in the land is one of practically universal accep-
tance. The principle has been stated by courts and text writers in very
broad terms. Thus, our pioneer American authority in the field, Mr.
Justice Story generalizes: "All the authorities recognize the principle
in its fullest import, that real estate is exclusively subject to the laws of
the government, within whose territory it is situate." 2 And speaking
for a unanimous court, Mr. Justice Miller in McGoon v. Scales 3 gen-
eralized to the effect that: "It is a principle too firmly established to
admit of dispute at this day, that to the law of the state in which the
land is situated must we look for the rules which govern its descent,
alienation, and transfer, and for the effect and construction of con-
veyances."
Applications of the broad principle are easy to find. The law of
the situs governs the requisites of a deed to land,4 the quantum of the
estate conveyed, 5 the validity of a will devising land,6 the determina-
tion of the question whether the will has been revoked,1 whether a trust
can be created in real estate,8 whether a grantor has legal capacity to
convey. 9 It would be affectation to multiply instances, for the general
principle is well known and thoroughly established.
Like some other general rules of law,' 0 the reasons which lie
underneath are seldom stated. Two adequate explanations of this one,
however, seem to be clear. There is the necessity of practical con-
venience in the selling of real estate, which in this country is as simple
i. The present writer has endeavored to state why the two-state element should
make a difference in a paper called Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts (1930) 36
W. VA. L. Q. 156. Compare, for a different point of view: Cavers, A Critique of the
Choice-of-Law Problem (933) 47 HARV. L. REv. 173.
2. STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (834) § 428.
3. 9 Wall. 23, 27 (U. S. 1869).
4. See 2 BEALE, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1935) § 215.1; GOODRICH, CON-
FLICT OF LAWS (1938) § 144, and cases there cited.
5. 2 BEALE, op. cit. supra note 4 at § 221.1; GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 4 at
§ 144, n. 7.
6. 2 BEALE, op. cit. spra note 4 at § 249.1; GOODRICH, Op. cit. supra note 4 at § 162,
and cases there cited.
7. 2 BEALE, op. cit. supra note 4 at § 250.1; GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 4 at § 162.
8. 2 BEALE, op. cit. supra note 4 at § 241.1; GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 4 at § 147.
9. 2 BEALE, op. cit. supra note 4 at § 216.1; GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 4 at § 144.
io. Like that, for instance, that one state will not open its courts to the enforce-
ment of the penal or fiscal laws of another. Huntingdon v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, 671
(1892) ; Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S. 265 (1888) ; Moore v. Mitchell, 28
F. (2d) 997 (S. D. N. Y. 1928), 30 F. (2d) 6oo (C. C. A. 2d, 1929), 281 U. S. 18
(193o) ; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 61o, comment c, § 611; cf. Mil-
waukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U. S. 268 (1935). See Sack, (Non-) Enforce-
ment of Foreign Revenue Laws in International Law and Practice (1933) 81 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 559.
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and almost as common as selling a motor car. Instruments affecting
land must, under universal recording statutes, be recorded if a subse-
quent purchaser is to take subject to them. Whether the strength of
the chain of title is to be passed upon by the individual lawyer for a
prospective purchaser, or by counsel for a title insurance company, the
convenience of a single state's law to check against is clear. Another
reason is less practical, but equally controlling. Reference to the law
of the situs for questions concerning land is the natural one for the
American lawyer to make. He thinks in terms of a law which is terri-
torial," and this reference fits that method of thinking. The combina-
tion of practical advantage and theoretical "at homeness" results in a
rule the authority of which is unquestioned.1
2
One of the characteristics of a mature mind is its ability to make
distinctions and gradations; people and issues are not black or white,
but varying shades of gray. Likewise, a mature system of law, which
the common law now is, develops distinctions, limitations and qualifica-
tions as called for, instead of fitting all problems of litigants into a
limited series of grooves. A few of those limitations upon and qualifi-
cations of the universal reference to the law of the situs show that the
Conflict of Laws, though comparatively new in the divisions of our
common law, has gained the benefit of the maturity of legal thinking
which we can now claim.
The first limitation upon the broad principle of reference to the
law of the situs appears in the distinction between transactions which
purport to change the ownership of interests in land and transactions
which have land as their subject-matter. In other words, there is a dis-
tinction made between conveyances of land and contracts which concern
land. Suppose A and B, for instance, in state X make an agreement by
which A promises, for a consideration, to convey land in state Y to B.
ii. For a critical examination of the territorial concept, see Cook, The Logical
and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 457; The Jurisdiction
of Sovereign States and the Conflict of Laws (193) 31 COL. L. REV. 368; Lorenzen,
Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 736.
12. A third reason which ought not to be too greatly stressed in our day is un-
doubtedly significant if only historically. Since land is immovable, the state of its situs
is the only sovereignty which can exercise physical power over it and the exercise of
such power is not an infrequent occurrence. It is perhaps quite natural that the sov-
ereign exercise that power in accordance with its own rules. See Holmes, J., in Poison
v. Stewart, 167 Mass. 211, 45 N. E. 737 (1897) ; 2 BEALE op. cit. supra note 4 at
§ 214.1. But there is no logical reason why the exercise of that power should not fol-
low a prior determination of the rights of the parties, that determination being reached
by reference to the laws of some other place. Moreover, well advanced civilized society
should not have to rely upon the primitive concept of power to enforce as the justifica-
tion for a rule. For example, we have come a long way from the original idea of phys-
ical power as the basis for the existence of personal jurisdiction. E. g. Washington v.
Superior Court, 289 U. S. 361 (1933) ; Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352 (1927) ; Inter-
national Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579 (1914) ; Dodd, Jurisdiction in Per-
sonal Actions (1929) 23 ILL. L. REv. 427. Compare, DiCEy, CoNFLIrc OF LAws (5th
ed. by Keith, 1932) 30.
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Suppose that by the law of the state where the land is, A, who is a
married woman, has no power to convey land, but that by the law of the
state where the parties make their agreement A has all the legal powers
of an adult, unmarried woman. One might refuse to make any devia-
tion from the general rule in such a case and refer the validity of this
whole transaction to the law of the situs. The English rule, as stated
in Dicey, is broad enough to sustain this position generally.13  And it
is certainly a possible position for a court to take. On the other hand,
the general rule as to the determination of the validity of a contract, as
set out in the Restatement, refers this question to the place of contract-
ing. 1 4 While this may be an over-simplification, and there is confusion
in the authorities upon the subject,15 it seems almost as natural a view
to take with regard to the contract rule as the reference to the place
where the land is as the rule with regard to the land's transfer. But
if the law of the place of contracting is looked to with reference to the
validity of the contract and the law of the situs is looked to with ref-
erence to the validity of the conveyance one may come out with an
enforceable contract to convey but be under a legal disability to carry
out the agreement. Obviously, a decree for specific performance would
hardly lie, at least until such time as the disability is removed.
But the existence of a disability has no bearing on the question of
the validity of the contract. Thus in the leading case of Polson v.
Stewart 16 the disability had been terminated by death and the court
gave a remedy equivalent to specific performance. The essence of the
distinction was characteristically stated by Justice Holmes: "It is true
that the laws of other States cannot render valid conveyances of prop-
erty within our borders which our laws say are void, for the plain rea-
son that we have exclusive power over the res. . . . But the same
reason inverted establishes that the lex rei sitze cannot control personal
covenants, not purporting to be conveyances, between persons outside
the jurisdiction, although concerning a thing within it. . . . If valid
by the law of North Carolina there is no reason why the contract should
not be enforced here." 17
13. DICEY, op. cit. supra note 12 at 583, 597, 683, 953.
14. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (934) § 332.
15. See, for example, Miller v. Wilson, 146 Ill. 523, 34 N. E. nn (1893) ; Mey-
link v. Rhea, 123 Iowa 310, 98 N. W. 779 (1904) ; Farm Loan Co. v. Beale, 113 Neb.
293, 202 N. W. 877 (1925) ; Mayer v. Roche, 77 N. J. L. 681, 75 Ati. 235 (1909) ;
Abell v. Douglass, 4 Denio 305 (N. Y. 1847) ; Anderson v. May, Io Heisk. 84 (Tenn.
1872) ; Poole v. Perkins, 126 Va. 331, 101 S. E. 240 (1gg) ; Beale, What Law Gov-
erns the Validity of a Contract (19o9) 23 HARV. L. REV. 1, 79, 194, 260; Cook, "Con-
tracts" and the Conflict of Laws (1936) 31 ILL. L. REV. 143; Cook, "Contracts" and
the Conflict of Laws: "Intention" of the Parties (1938) 32 ILL. L. REv. 899; (939)
34 ILL. L. REV. 423; Greene, The New York Rule as to the Law Governing the Valid-
ity of Contracts (1927) 12 CORN. L. Q. 286.
16. 167 Mass. 211, 45 N. E. 737 (1897).
17. Id. at 214, 45 N. E. at 738.
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Could an action for damages for breach of contract successfully
have been brought prior to the removal of the disability? The logic of
the distinction indicates an affirmative answer.
Again, suppose the facts be varied a little. Suppose that state X,
where a contract was made, has a thirty-day notice provision governing
a vendor who wishes to cancel a contract for the sale of land with a
vendee who has defaulted. Suppose that the land which the vendor
agrees to sell and the buyer agrees to pay for is in state Y and that in
state Y there is no such thirty-day provision. Must the vendor, if the
vendee defaults his payment, give the thirty-day notice according to
the terms of the contract? Or is it sufficient if he complies with the
rules of state Yf That situation arose in a Minnesota case, that State
being state X in our example, and the Supreme Court of the United
States said it was not lack of due process for the Minnesota court to
apply its local rule about cancellation of contracts. "As to the contract
simply, we have no doubt of the State's power over it, and the law of
the State, therefore, constitutes a part of it." 18 The Minnesota law,
therefore, was properly chosen to determine the rights of the parties
upon the contract side of the transaction. The logical inference is,
and it has so been held,' that the law of the place where the land is
will determine whether the purchaser got an interest in the land and
upon his default how that interest could be foreclosed.
One more instance will suffice on this phase of the discussion. Let
us state again the case of a married woman grantor. She executes an
instrument in X where she has full powers both to convey and to con-
tract. Her deed contains the usual warranties. The subject-matter of
the deed is land in Y where a married woman may neither contract nor
convey. On the application of the general rule, it is quite clear that
ownership of the land is not passed by the conveyance to the grantee.
Would not the grantor, however, be liable in an action at law upon the
covenants? She would unless there is some countervailing reason for
assimilating to the same governing law rules both as to the deed as a
conveyance and that part of the deed which deals with covenants. This
question will be noted a little further on. In the case where approxi-
mately this set of facts came up the question before the court was
changed just a little. The grantor, having made this ineffective deed
found herself in a dispute in the state of the situs for possession of the
land with the grantee's successor. The court held that no matter what
liability there might be in damages in an action on the general covenant
of warranty considered as a contract, the covenant could not have the
I8. Selover, Bates & Co. v. Walsh, 226 U. S. 112 (1912).
ig. Kryger v. Wilson, 242 U. S. i7i (I916).
422 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
effect of estopping the grantor from claiming the land, since that would
result in an indirect means of transferring title, something which she
could not do.20 The result does not have any special appeal to one's
sense of fairness as to the outcome of the dispute between these two
parties, but it is compatible with the dogma that interests in land are
controlled exclusively by the law of the place where the land is.
Is there any value in the distinction thus drawn between contracts
about land and transfers of interests in land? It is not at all clear that
any social utility for such a distinction can be proved. The differentia-
tion is logical. That neither proves nor disproves that it is valuable.
It is one which finds its counterpart in the law having to do with the
transfer of interests in chattels and contracts concerning chattels. 2' In
real estate matters also one need not quarrel with it, although he may
admit that civilization would not crumble if the distinction disappeared
and both the contractual and the conveyancing sides of the transfer of
land were referred to the law of the place where the land is.
More controversial points may arise with regard to the action of
equity courts upon persons before them if the result of the action is to
produce a change in ownership of land located elsewhere. It is said
broadly that equitable interests in land are determined by the law of the
situs. 2 2  Professor Beale has commented on the rule with the epigram:
"Whether they work out their right through the sheriff or the chan-
cellor is, after all, merely a question of procedure". 23  A trust of land
creates an equitable interest therein if the interest of the beneficiary is
in a thing and not merely a right to have the trustee carry out the terms
of the trust.2 4  Whatever one calls a constructive trust a small but
important group of cases shows that equity's power to give appropriate
relief is not limited to a reference to the rules which govern interests in
foreign land. The old case of Lord Cranstown v. Johnston,25 somewhat
modified, provides a striking illustration. The defendant by fraudulent
representations in England deceives the plaintiff into inaction with
regard to the state of accounts between them. In the meantime, the
defendant brings an action through foreign attachment proceedings in
the Island of St. Christopher and, obtaining judgment in the absence
of the other party, proceeds to subject the other's plantation to sale and
buys it in himself. By the law of St. Christopher the defendant has
20. Smith v. Ingram, 132 N. C. 959, 44 S. E. 643 (1903).
21. GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 4 at §§ 149, 150.
22. RESTATEMFENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) §§ 239, 240.
23. Beale, Equitable Interests in Foreign Property (197o) 20 HARV. L. REV. 382.
24. Obviously a discussion of this question, which has been the subject of historical
controversy, is beyond the scope of this paper. The interested reader will find the point
completely discussed by Scott and Stone in their classic articles, The Nature of the
Rights of the Cestui Que Trust (917) 17 COL. L. REV. 269. 467.
25. 3 Ves. Jr. 170, 30 Eng. Rep. R. 952 (1796) ; see Beale, note 23 supra.
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now become complete owner of the land, not subject to any trust or
other duty. The plaintiff sues the defendant in England in an equity
court. By reference to the foreign law it is undisputed that the land is
the defendant's, free and clear. Yet the court orders the defendant to
reconvey subject only to being paid what the plaintiff owes him. As
specific reparation for an English tort the defendant is ordered to con-
vey foreign land which, under the law of the situs, unconditionally
belongs to him. A similar result was reached in a contract case a little
later on.26 Judge Learned Hand, in an interesting case in the Second
Circuit, made a modern application of the same principle in Irving
Trust Co. v. Md. Casualty Co.
2 7
These cases make no logical invasion upon the rule that the law of
the situs governs interests in land. As Judge Hand pointed out, the
decision does not turn upon equitable ownership by the plaintiff. The
court gives a decree which has its effect upon foreign land as reparation
for a tort or specific performance of a contract, and orders against a
defendant to convey foreign land in an appropriate case have long been
standard practice.28  But that the result of such litigation affects
foreign land cannot be doubted.
It is to be observed that the plaintiff must have some claim against
the defendant in order that he may ask equity to act. He has, by
hypothesis, no ownership in the land. Defendant must have done some-
thing to him which entitles him to recover, otherwise he has no basis
for relief. This is shown by a decision like Norris v. Chambers.29 A,
in England, agrees to sell land in Germany to B. By the law of Ger-
many this agreement creates no interest in the land in the purchaser.
C, knowing that there was a contract between A and B receives a con-
veyance of the land from A. Now B sues C asking that C be directed
to convey the land to him. But B had no interest in the land itself nor
did C, merely by taking the conveyance with knowledge, commit a tort
since, by hypothesis, he did not induce A to break the contract with B.
There was no wrong on which to base a claim for specific reparation.
Another group of cases-those involving security transactions-
neatly brings out the distinction between contract and conveyance. A
in state X, for good consideration, gives B a promissory note for the
payment of money and executes a conveyance of land in state Y as
security. A has full competency by the law of X but not by the law of
Y. What are the creditor's rights? The competency of a grantor to
26. Ex Parte Pollard, Montague & Chitty 239 (184o).
27. 83 F. (2d) 168 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936).
28. Penn v. Lord Baltimore, I Ves. Sr. 444, 27 Eng. Rep. R. 1132 (1750); see Ex
Parte Pollard, Montague & Chitty 239, 251 (1840).
29. 29 BeaV. 246 (i86i), aff'd, 3 De G. F. & J. 583, 45 Eng. Rep. R. 1004 (861);
see also Norton v. Florence Land and Public Works Co., 7 Ch. D. 332 0877).
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convey is determined by the law of the situs and, therefore, B cannot
hold the land as security for the note.30 But, of course, the note would
be good as an independent contract. Now turn the case around.
Assume that by the X law A has no capacity to contract or convey, but
by Y law has full capacity. In one decision, which came up in a rather
peculiar way on the pleadings, it was held that this transaction could
be effective as creating a charge on the land. Such a charge did not
require a principal obligation to support it. 31 In another case A's note
was given jointly with her husband. Even though she was not under
personal liability on the note, her mortgage could stand as security for
the husband's debt. 32 But if the mortgage is security only for a prin-
cipal debt which falls for lack of capacity on the part of the promisor
there is nothing for the mortgagee to enforce.
33
A minor question under this heading is what law determines the
assumption of a mortgage debt by a subsequent grantee of the mort-
gaged premises. Land in X has been subjected to stand as security for
a debt contracted by the owner in state Y. Then in state Z the owner
conveys the land What law determines whether the subsequent
grantee, in the absence of express agreement, assumes the burden of
the debt or merely takes the land subject to the mortgagee's lien? It
has been held that this involves the contractual as distinguished from
the conveyancing part of the transaction and the question was referred
to the law of the place of the transaction and not that of the state where
the land was located.
34
Covenants for title raise some questions which are not easy to allo-
cate between reference to the law of the contract and reference to the
law of the situs. Suppose a conveyance made in X of land in Y. Sup-
pose, further, a statute in Y by which, unless it was expressed to the
contrary, the conveyance carries with it the usual covenants. The deed
made in X contains no express words. Does the Y law apply to impose
the obligations of a covenantor upon the grantor? And shall a distinc-
tion be made between such covenants as that of seisin which is said, at
least by some authorities, not to run with the land, and a covenant of
warranty which does run with the land? The Restatement 35 says that
those duties which are contractual in nature are controlled by the law
of the place of contracting, but that the law of the place where the land
is determines the duties of the grantor which are not contractual. The
30. Swank v. Hufnagle, iIi Ind. 453, 12 N. E. 303 (1887) ; Wood v. Wheeler, 111
N. C. 231, 16 S. E. 418 (1892).
31. Frierson v. Williams, 57 Miss. 451 (1879).
32. Thompson v. Kyle, 39 Fla. 582, 23 So. 12 (1897).
33. Burr v. Beckler, 264 Ill. 230, lo6 N. E. 2o6 (1914).
34. Liljedahl v. Glassgow, i9o Iowa 827, 18o N. W. 870 (1921) ; see also Brown
v. Dalton, io5 Ky. 669, 49 S. W. 443 (1899).
35. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 341.
TWO STATES AND REAL ESTATE
obligation upon a grantor "of making good a defective title" is classi-
fied as a duty of the latter type. Perhaps the distinction is valid, but
it must be confessed that it is just a little hard to follow. At any rate,
there is adequate authority for holding that the obligation upon the
grantor in this respect is determined by the law of the situs of the
land.
3 6
If one accepts the distinction drawn by the Restatement, however,
does it dispose of all the questions? What law will be looked to in
determining whether the covenant of seisin runs with the land? And if
it does not in a technical sense run with the land, does a purported trans-
fer by the first grantee carry with it an assignment of such grantee's
claim against the covenantor? What law will determine the existence
and extent of the estoppel involved in a covenant of warranty? What
law will determine what is sufficient performance of the covenant for
further assurances? These questions seem to the writer more closely
connected with rights in the land than with rights growing out of a
contract,3 7 and, furthermore, as a practical matter, it seems better to
refer them all to the law of the place where the land is.
The final problem for testing the limitations and qualifications
upon our general dogma is that of the recognition of the foreign equity
decree. This question has been much discussed in legal periodicals
over a period of years. 38 The threshing over of old straw is not indi-
cated. Here is the fact situation: A and B have litigation in state X.
The litigation may involve A's rights against B on a contract to convey
land in Y; A may be claiming Y land as specific reparation for a tort;
or, as in some of the cases, A and B may be parties to a divorce suit in
X and the Y land becomes involved as part of an alimony claim made
by B upon A. At any rate, the court in X makes a decree by which A
is ordered to convey the land in Y to B. He fails to do so. Now B,
armed with the X decree, sues A in Y asking the Y court to give her
the land. How far do B's rights go? And if B's rights are considered
as settled by the first decree how far does that cut into our general rule
36. Platner v. Vincent, 187 Cal. 443, 2o2 Pac. 655 (1921), (1922) 10 CALIF. L.
REV. 174, see also (1921) 9 CALIF. L. REv. 234; Alcorn v. Epler, 206 11. App. 140
(1917) ; Crane v. Blackman, 126 Ill. App. 631 (19o6) ; Lyndon Lumber Co. v. Sawyer,
135 Wis. 525, 116 N. W. -255 (19o8). But see Jackson v. Green, 112 Ind. 341, 14 N. E.
89 (1887) ; Craig v. Donovan, 63 Ind. 513 (1878) ; Bethell v. Bethell, 54 Ind. 428 (1876).
37. GOODRICH, op. cit. suipra note 4 at § 146.
38. Barbour, The Extraterritorial Effect of the Equitable Decree (ii) I7 MICH.
L. REv. 527; Cook, The Powers of Courts of Equity (1915) IS COL. L. REV. 37, io6,
228; Goodrich, Enforcement of a Foreign Equitable Decree (192o) 5 IowA L. BULL.
230; Lorenzen, Application of Full Faith and Credit Clause to Equitable Decrees for
the Conveyance of Foreign Land (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 591; Schofield, Equity Juris-
diction under the Full Faith and Credit Clause: Fahl v. Eastin- (1910) 5 ILL. L. REV.
I. Notes (1918) 31 HARv. L. REV. 646; (1912) 25 HARV. L. Rnv. 653; (910) 23
HARV. L. REV. 390; (1908) 21 HARV. L. REV. 210, 354; (1924) 22 MICH. L. REV. 469;
(igg) 18 MICH. L. REV. 142; (1919) 29 YALE L. J. 119; (1919) 28 YALE L. J. 5o3;
(1924) 22 MICH. L. REV. 370, 730.
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that rights concerning land are settled by the law of the place where
the land is?
Some of the underlying problems have been pretty well settled by
authorities whose venerability leaves them beyond question. Equity
courts, as said above, have been ordering defendants before them to
convey foreign land ever since the days of Penn v. Lord Baltimore.39
The theory is, of course, that the Chancellor acts upon the conscience
of the defendant before him and through pressure on the defendant
can have him do something that has its effect abroad. Furthermore,
if the defendant makes a conveyance in pursuance of such an order he
may not deny, even in the state of situs, that the conveyance is his own
free act and deed even though he made it to get out of jail.
40
The difficulty arises when the defendant has failed to convey and
has succeeded in evading the clutches of the court which made the order.
Suppose the court appointed a master to make the conveyance in place
of the now absentee defendant. The courts have said a number of times
that this conveyance, made by a court officer, could not change the own-
ership of the foreign land. 41 This seems to accord with the rules which
have been thought to be pretty fundamental about the control of the
state over land within its borders.
But let us carry our first case a little further. Remember that our
plaintiff, having gotten his foreign decree, comes to the state of the
situs and there sues the defendant, obtaining personal jurisdiction over
him. One point should be eliminated at once. If the suit is in equity
there is the preliminary question whether the forum extends the extraor-
dinary aid of equity in that type of case. We will assume a situation
properly cognizable by the chancellor. Is our plaintiff helped by the
foreign decree or must he begin de novo?
The position has been taken, and it harks back to Lord Coke, that
the only effect of an equity decree is to create a duty on the part of the
defendant to the court making the decree. Thus in Bullock v. Bullock 42
it was said:
"The contention that such an order requiring lands in New
Jersey to be charged with alimony created a personal obligation
on the respondent is, in my judgment, without force. It is a mis-
use of terms to call the burden thereby imposed on respondent a
personal obligation. At the most, the decree and order imposed a
duty on him, which duty he owed to the court making them. . .
39. I Ves. Sr. 444, 27 Eng. Rep. R. 1132 (Ch. 1750). See the cases collected in
Notes (1927) si A. L. R. lo8i, (1910) 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 42o, (191o) 23 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 9"4, (igo6) 69 L. R. A. 673.
40. Ibid. Goodrich, note 38 mepra.
41. Ibid.
42. 52 N. J. Eq. 561, 569, 3o At. 676, 679 (1894).
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"The establishment of the contrary doctrine would result in
practically depriving a state of that exclusive control over immov-
able property therein which has always been accorded. For exam-
ple, by our statutes, contracts respecting lands, to be enforceable.
must be entered into and evidenced in a particular mode, but our
courts, upon equitable grounds, sometimes enforce contracts that
are without the statute. It is the province of our legislature to
prescribe the rule for such contracts and for our courts to construe
the rule so prescribed and to determine when such contracts,
whether within or without the statute, may be enforced. It is
true that the courts of another state, proceeding in personam to
enforce a contract for lands in New Jersey, would be bound to
determine whether the contract was enforceable under our laws.
But they would construe those laws, and if their decree in per-
sonam may and must be conclusive in our courts and compel a
decree in conformity therewith, it is obvious that the contract will
be enforced according to whatever construction the foreign court
put upon our laws, and not according to the construction of our
own courts."
When it is realized that an equity decree for the payment of money
can not only be sued upon in another state, but can be sued upon in an
action at law,43 it is obvious that there is nothing to the contention that
an equity decree creates a duty only to the court. As to the fear that
the foreign court may misinterpret or misapply local law, it is sufficient
to say that the same danger exists in every conflict of laws case, whether
it involves rights in land or any other subject matter. The prophylaxis
would be to have all cases tried locally and abolish the whole field of
conflict of laws, and certainly no one would seriously suggest such a
result.
Nor is there much of an argument to make in favor of the defend-
ant on this question. He has had his day in court for the litigation of
the issues. The rule which limits a litigant to one law suit to settle a
given issue between himself and another is broad and well founded. It
has recently been authoritatively enlarged to preclude the relitigation of
jurisdictional facts. 44  The Restatement position on the subject4' is
that the decree is conclusive as res judicata upon facts found in the pre-
vious suit between the parties, but that the plaintiff must sue upon the
original claim. The explanation is that except in the case of a judg-
ment for the payment of money an action does not lie in one state upon
43. Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U. S. I (191o) ; Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U. S. 183 (19Ol) ;
GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 4 at § 135; 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) § io65.
44. Davis v. Davis, 305 U. S. 32 (1938) ; Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165 (1938) ;
(1939) 87 U. OF PA. L. REV. 346; (1939) 39 COL. L. REv. 274; (1939) 27 GFo. L. J.
1137; (1939) 52 HARV. L. REV. 683; (1939) 25 VA. L. REv. 487, 725; Notes (1939)
48 YALE L. J. 879; (1939) 6 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 290, 293; (1939) 23 MINN. L. REv.
673.
45. § 449.
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the judgment of another, 46 for the form of relief must be discretionary
according to the law of the forum. And with this view our plaintiff
should sue on the original claim but he would have the benefit of the
rules of res judicata as to his rights and the defendant's obligations.
This view, which has been taken by some very good courts, 47 is one
which is in accordance with the modern trend of the law and has the
support of most of the current legal writers upon the subject.
48
The problem as to res judicata is a puzzling one. The American
Law Institute is now engaged in writing a Restatement of the Law of
Judgments and those of us engaged in it have found it bristling with
difficulties and a field where comparatively little analytical work has
been done. The broad doctrine known as res judicata breaks down,
when analyzed, into three parts. One has to do with its effect in merg-
ing the claim of a successful plaintiff. His original claim disappears and
his rights are now upon the judgment. Secondly, if the defendant
wins the law suit upon the merits, that constitutes a bar to further action
by the plaintiff upon the claim. The third effect is what may be called
collateral estoppel by which propositions of fact and, in some instances,
of law which have been litigated are settled for any litigation arising
thereafter between the parties and those in privity with them. A valid
final judgment for money ordinarily carries all three of these effects.
The question arises whether there is a distinction between judgments
for money and other kinds of judgments. Or possibly the distinction
may be between domestic effects, both of judgments and decrees, and
their recognition in other States. Furthermore, can this latter distinc-
tion be maintained in view of the full faith and credit clause? A not
dissimilar problem arises in connection with custody orders for children
in divorce suits.4 9 An authoritative guide upon the constitutional ques-
tion is lacking.50
46. § 447.
47. Burnley v. Stevenson, 24 Ohio St. 474 (1873) ; Matson v. Matson, 186 Iowa
607, 173 N. W. 127 (1919) ; Redwood Investment Co. v. Exley, 64 Cal. App. 455, 221
Pac. 973 (1923) ; Mallette v. Scheerer, 164 Wis. 415, I6o N. W. 182 (1916) ; Dunlap
v. Byers. iio Mich. lo9, 67 N. W. io67 (1896); McCune v. Goodwillie, 204 Mo. 3o6,
102 S. W. 997 (197o) ; Williams v. Williams, 83 Or. 59, 162 Pac. 834 (1917).
48. Lorenzen and Heilman, The Restatement of the Conflict of Laws (1935) 83
U. oF PA. L. REv. 555, 581, 582 (1935) ; Goodrich, Institute Bards and Yale Reviewers
(1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 449, 462 (1935); see 2 BEALE, THE CONFLICT OF LAws
(1935) § 449.1.
49. Goodrich, Custody of Children in Divorce Suits (1921) 7 CoRN. L. Q. I.
50. In Fall v. Eastin, 215 U. S. I (19o9) a Washington court had awarded land
in Nebraska to the wife in divorce proceedings. The husband did not obey the decree
but conveyed the land to third parties, whereupon the wife brought a bill in Nebraska
to quiet title to the land, serving the husband's grantees. The Nebraska court refused
to grant the relief prayed for, and the Supreme Court held that there was no violation
of the full faith and credit clause. Although the majority opinion is difficult to fol-
low, Justice Holmes' concurring opinion points out a solid ground for the result. The
case did not involve the parties to the Washington proceeding, and there was no con-
stitutional question raised by the Nebraska court's refusal to extend the effect of the
judgment to the husband's grantees, whether they were innocent purchasers or not.
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If one may make a guess it is that the development of the law will
be in the direction of extending the scope of the full faith and credit
clause rather than toward a narrowing in the other direction. 1 The
American Law Institute will, in course of time, doubtless wend its way
through the mazes involved in a restatement of the law of judgments.
Whether or not the foreign equity decree receives the full benefit
of all which is involved in the broad doctrine of res judicata, the posi-
tion of the Restatement 52 is obviously sufficient, if followed, to entitle
the plaintiff to rely upon the decree for relief in the state where the land
is located. Again the effect is indirectly, at least, to give a measure
of foreign control to the ownership of local land and to that extent nar-
row the application of the broad dogma.
All of these instances, taken together, do not sweep away the valid-
ity of the general rule that rights in land are governed by the law of the
place where the land is located. They do show that courts, concerned
with the alternative of applying the very broad principle blindly and
limiting or qualifying it in a particular case, do the latter when, in their
judgment, limitation or qualification is desirable. One may or may
not like a particular instance of such limitation. But that courts should
be prepared to reexamine broad theories and shape them to fit the com-
plications of changing life seems a point too clear to be labored. That
is what courts are for and that is what courts do.
51. See, for example, Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U. S. 268 (1935)
Roche v. McDonald, 275 U. S. 449 (1928).
52. RESTATEM.ENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (934) § 449.
